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Abstract 
 
In Britain, the NHS spends millions of pounds a year compensating patients injured 
during medical treatment.  As in many other jurisdictions, compensation is paid if the 
patient can demonstrate that treatment was supplied negligently.  However, concern 
over the cost, effectiveness and administrative efficiency of this approach has led 
jurisdictions like Sweden, New Zealand and some US states to alter the basis for 
compensation, and the Department of Health has now published proposals for reform 
in England.    We present new research to assess the current approach in England and, 
for the first time, to provide costings for some key alternatives to have featured in the 
latest policy debate.  We also draw some lessons for reform from international 
experience. 
  
Keywords: Health, Compensation, Negligence, No-fault 
JEL classification: I18, K13 
 
   2 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Sustaining an injury related to medical care can have serious economic and health 
consequences, and such injuries are a growing concern in many countries due to a 
perception that the costs they give rise to are rapidly increasing. Public policy in this 
area can be regarded as having to address two key objectives: providing compensation 
to those who have suffered injuries, and providing incentives to practitioners to supply 
an appropriate standard of care. However, different countries have adopted widely 
varying strategies in pursuit of these objectives, and in particular have adopted very 
different approaches to the question of liability for injury.  
 
In the UK, victims of medical injuries can claim compensation by filing a legal claim 
against the alleged perpetrator, such as a hospital or individual practitioner. In order to 
secure an award of damages, the claimant must prove that the defendant is at fault for 
the injuries cited, or, in the current UK terminology, that the tort of clinical negligence 
has occurred. This negligence liability approach, however, is not found in all 
jurisdictions. For example, in Sweden, New Zealand and some American states, it is 
sufficient mainly to prove that the defendant caused the injuries in order to receive 
damages.  Because it is not necessary to prove negligence, these schemes are often 
termed ‘no-fault’ schemes, and are typically thought to have lower administrative 
costs due to the reduced burden of proof.1 These contrasting approaches to medical 
injury have many distributional and other consequences: for example, under 
negligence liability, if injurers take efficient care the victims bear all losses, whereas 
under no-fault the injurers bear all losses irrespective of their care decision. However, 
research attention has focused on two particular areas of interest: first, assessing the 
respective cost and efficiency characteristics of negligence liability and no-fault 
schemes and, second, seeing whether other composite models can be created; for 
instance, models in which some element of fault must be proven, but in which the 
cost, delay and complexity involved in obtaining compensation are reduced by 
streamlining legal procedures and/or transferring liability from individual physicians 
to their employers.  
 
                                                 
1 Such schemes exist in the UK for criminal injuries compensation and some employment tribunals. They 
can be found in Europe, the US, Canada and Australasia, covering compensation for, e.g., automobile 
accidents and workers’ compensation – as well as clinical injuries.   
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The UK’s fault-based approach to compensation has received significant criticism for 
a number of years, and has been accused of failing either to provide fair compensation 
or to create incentives for deterrence. Most recently, the National Audit Office (NAO, 
2001), a major public inquiry (Kennedy, 2001) and the House of Commons Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC, 2002) have each proposed radical reform. The principal 
charges are that the system is costly to the NHS, imposes long delays on patients 
seeking redress, is administratively inefficient (in that the legal and administrative 
costs of cases regularly exceed the value of the damages at stake), and engenders a 
culture of secrecy and cover-up in which colleagues are unwilling to “blow the 
whistle” on bad practice and is therefore inimical to improved standards of care. In 
support of these charges, it has been noted that in 2000/01 total NHS provisions for 
future settlements of negligence claims stood at £4.4bn; that the average time to 
resolution of the 23,000 cases outstanding at the end of March 2000 (excluding the 
longest, most complex, cases) was over five years; and that in 65% of settlements 
below £50,000, legal costs exceeded damages.2  Recognising these concerns, the 
Secretary of State for Health established an Advisory Group in 2001 to examine 
possible reforms, and in June 2003 a set of proposals was published for consultation 
(DoH, 2003). Whilst it rejects a general move to no-fault compensation, a stated aim 
of this consultation document is to “move the role of tort from its current central 
position to the outer perimeter of the NHS.” (Chapter 8, paragraph 10).  In its place 
would be a “Redress Scheme” containing a fast procedure for resolving “small 
claims” (those with value below £30,000) – ultimately involving a relaxed standard of 
care – and a no-fault procedure for compensating birth-related neurological injuries 
(typically those injuries with the highest cost and complexity).  Under these proposals, 
a person would retain the right to sue through the courts but (except for neurologically 
impaired babies) with a presumption that they had first applied to the NHS Redress 
Scheme.  Those accepting packages of care (where possible to be provided by the 
NHS) and compensation under the scheme would be required to waive their right to 
go to court on the same case. 
 
It is clear that the Department of Health’s proposals constitute potentially significant 
reforms to the way clinical injuries are compensated by the NHS (and, given the sums 
                                                 
2 As an indication of the responses such figures have engendered, the Public Accounts Committee says they 
“represent a clear failure of the NHS and the legal system to deal with patients with speed and compassion”, 
and describes the costs as “a drain on scarce resources for improving patient care.” (p. 6). 
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involved, to resource allocation within the NHS).  Yet the empirical basis for the 
debate to which they contribute has not been strong in the UK.3  The purpose of this 
paper is to present findings from new research aimed at casting fresh light on this 
debate. The research was commissioned to inform the deliberations of the Secretary of 
State for Health's Advisory Group (see Fenn et al, 2002).  The paper is structured as 
follows.  Section 2 reviews briefly the economic theory underlying the objectives of 
patient compensation schemes.  In Section 3 we describe the institutional 
arrangements within which the English clinical negligence scheme operates,4 discuss 
its annual cash cost and assess its deterrence effects.  Section 4 summarises what is 
known about the structure and performance of several overseas no-fault schemes in 
order to draw lessons for reform in England and identify data requirements for 
modelling such reform. In Section 5 we estimate, for the first time, the cost of 
possible reforms, paying particular attention to “small claims” fault-based schemes of 
the type proposed in DoH (2003), and to a commonly cited model for no-fault 
compensation in England: the Swedish no-fault scheme. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2 THE ECONOMICS OF PATIENT COMPENSATION 
 
As stated in the Introduction, patient compensation schemes are a means by which 
two objectives can be pursued: the cost of the harm can be transferred from the patient 
(the ‘compensation’ objective); and the clinician can be given an incentive to take 
appropriate care to avoid making mistakes which may harm other patients (the 
‘deterrence’ objective). All patient compensation schemes attempt to deliver these 
objectives jointly with varying degrees of success, and with varying administration 
costs.5
 
 
 
                                                 
For example, see Fenn et al (1994; 2000), Vincent (2001). 
4  Our data and discussion relate to England unless otherwise stated.  However, as Scotland and Wales 
currently have clinical negligence schemes similar to that in England (i.e. fault-based) but with minor 
differences, many of the issues we discuss are also relevant to them. 
5 In some systems, the two objectives have been explicitly separated (or “decoupled”); one mechanism 
can be set up to deliver compensation to patients, another to secure medical accountability. 
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2.1. Compensation 
 
The economic basis for viewing compensation schemes purely as solutions to a risk-
sharing problem between patients and clinicians is weak.6 There are likely to be many 
more efficient mechanisms for delivering risk transfer benefits to patients facing 
possible losses through medical care, including private first party insurance (e.g. an 
income replacement or medical expenses policy), a negotiated sick pay scheme 
through which employers meet losses as part of a wages and conditions package, or 
social insurance (e.g. disability benefits). Indeed Danzon (2000a) raises the question 
of why someone should be compensated for illness when caused by medical care but 
not if similar losses arise as the result of (say) genetically inherited birth defects. 
Following this line of argument, it is possible that the most equitable and 
administratively efficient means of delivering the compensation objective would in 
fact be via a social insurance programme, and – as will be seen below – the interaction 
between clinical negligence schemes and insurance provision is an important and 
sometimes overlooked influence on the performance of such schemes. 
 
2.2. Deterrence 
 
Harmful outcomes arising from medical treatment can be reduced if those involved 
take care to avoid them.  However, to the extent that care is costly, doctors may need 
to be given incentives to provide it.  One natural incentive against insufficient care 
levels is to make the person causing the harm (assuming causation can be determined) 
liable for the costs involved, if he fails to supply care beyond a sufficient threshold 
(i.e. behaves ‘negligently’). In theory, the appropriate level of care (x) minimises total 
accident costs x + D(x), where D(x) is the resulting damages, assumed to be 
decreasing and convex in x.  The optimal level of care solves 1 + D′(x*) = 0: the 
marginal social benefit from an extra unit of care should equal its marginal social 
cost.7   
 
When the standard of care is known to everyone, and observable (to individuals and 
courts), it is straightforward to show that negligence liability would produce socially 
                                                 
6 It should be noted, however, that some lawyers see the payment of compensation by those responsible 
as an end in itself (“corrective justice”). 
7 See Miceli (1997) for more detailed models of liability rules.   
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optimal levels of care (i.e. deterrence).  Letting u(W) be the clinician’s utility of 
wealth, his care level solves:  “u(W−x) if x ≥ x*; u(W−x−D(x)) if x < x*”.  Provided D 
> x*, the clinician will choose the efficient level of care.8  Figure 1 explains this 
result.  The total costs of the accident are given by the curve x + D(x) and are 
minimised at x*, the optimal care level.  The negligence rule results in the clinician 
facing no further liability above x*, creating a discontinuity in his cost function, which 
becomes PQRS.  Clearly, his cost minimising decision is to set x = x*. 
 
x*
£
0 Care (x)
x
D(x)
x+D(x)P
Q
R
S
Figure 1: Optimal care under negligence and strict liability
 
 
Of course, common sense and the observed real-world demand for liability insurance 
tell us that these conditions are strict and that overwhelming information problems 
will typically prevent such a result.  For example, courts cannot determine precisely 
what care a clinician has taken, while it is often the case that opinions differ as to 
what constitutes an appropriate standard of care.  Further, clinicians may be unsure of 
the level of damages involved in the case. These can have numerous implications for 
the successful operation of a negligence system. Particularly important here is that 
parties worried about mistakenly being found liable or facing uncertain damages may 
over-invest in care or reduce their involvement in that clinical area. In the medical 
                                                 
8 The condition D > x* becomes more likely to hold if D is more widely interpreted to include any 
reputational loss suffered by a negligent clinician.  Interestingly, Lewis et al (2003) suggest that UK personal 
injury litigation typically underestimates any loss-of-earnings component of D. 
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context, such behaviour is known as ‘defensive medicine’.9  Thus, when assessing a 
negligence rule for medical cases we should, ideally, compare the deterrence benefits 
of such a rule with the defensive costs it may induce.   
 
One way to overcome this problem may be to move to a system of ‘strict liability’, 
where proof of causation alone is sufficient to trigger compensation from the party 
whose actions led to the harm.  Cummins et al (2001) identify strict liability schemes 
with no-fault set-ups: in both cases payment of compensation is not contingent on the 
attribution of fault.  Because payment is made regardless of the injurer’s level of care, 
it overcomes problems associated with unpredictable care thresholds.  Also, to the 
extent that the injurer faces the costs of his actions, it can be shown to provide optimal 
incentives for care.10  Figure 1 illustrates this result since, under strict liability, the 
clinician’s total cost function mirrors the court’s (i.e. x + D(x)), so that he sets x = x*.  
However, once again real-world imperfections make this unlikely in practice; in 
particular, it is unclear whether courts can observe damage levels and set suitable 
penalties accordingly. Again, the prospect of excessive damages can stimulate 
excessive (i.e. defensive) levels of care, underlining the importance of recognising the 
trade-off between deterrence benefits and defensive costs when evaluating such 
schemes.11
 
Another important consideration when evaluating the deterrence effects of both 
liability rules outlined above is the role of third-party payers such as liability insurers.  
To the extent that potential injurers shift risk onto insurers they may avoid facing 
costs sufficient to induce appropriate care.  However, a range of measures available to 
insurers can mitigate these concerns, including experience-rated premiums and co-
payments/deductibles.12 An alternative third-party payer may be the individual’s 
employer (e.g. a clinician’s hospital).13  Under such ‘enterprise liability schemes’ (a 
version of which has existed in the NHS since 1990; see below and also Weiler, 
                                                 
9 Danzon (2000b) notes another (of many) problems in the case of clinical negligence.  If the care threshold 
is set by practitioners’ reports of ‘best practice’ (as is typically the case), this may lead to sub-optimal 
negligence rules to the extent that systematic errors exist within this ‘best practice’. 
10 Now the clinician maximises u(W−x−D(x)), yielding x = x*. 
11 Cummins et al (2001) show that it is not clear a priori whether negligence or strict liability generates 
higher care levels.  For negligence to produce this, a sufficient condition is that courts are ‘sufficiently 
accurate’ in assigning fault.  
12 The insurer may also seek to monitor its policyholders’ behaviour but the transactions costs of doing this 
may be prohibitive or damaging to the efficiency of the underlying liability rule. 
13 In the case of US health plans, the hospital and insurer often jointly bear the risk. 
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1991), the hospital may in turn seek to shift risk onto an insurer, and issues similar to 
those above will then arise.  Of course, in order to ensure that employees have 
incentives to supply care, the enterprise will need to have mechanisms in place to 
monitor, record, investigate and, possibly, punish any acts for which it is held liable.   
 
2.3. Administrative efficiency 
 
Whether patient compensation schemes actually compensate, deter, or do both, there 
is a second order question about the administrative efficiency with which they pursue 
these objectives. Much of the debate about the need for reform in England (and 
elsewhere) has in fact stemmed from a perception that fault-based schemes are 
characterised by unnecessary cost and delay. As a consequence, it is argued, those in 
need of compensation have been unable to obtain it, and those responsible have not 
always been held to account. A scheme designed purely to compensate should be able 
to do so with no greater administrative overheads than private and social insurance 
schemes. However, the cost of operating a system designed to achieve general 
deterrence benefits should also be judged in relation to the benefits from injuries 
averted. It is possible to make a case for the costly and lengthy process of 
investigation required by the courts as a means for identifying and remedying poor 
quality care. Of course, the extent of investigation costs will depend on the burden of 
proof. Danzon (2000b) observes that negligence-based liability for clinical negligence 
appears to involve higher administrative costs than alternative means of providing 
compensation (see Section 4 below).   
 
3. CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE IN ENGLAND 
 
3.1. Institutional background 
 
Clinical negligence in England has changed substantially over the last decade or so, 
and its evolution well illustrates many of the theoretical issues outlined above. Prior to 
1990, clinicians were individually liable for the consequences of their negligence, and 
therefore patients frequently cited both the hospital and the clinician when bringing a 
claim.  The hospital, as part of the NHS, would meet the cost out of its budget, while 
the clinician would meet the cost from one of several medical practitioner’s risk pools 
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to which he subscribed.  After 1990, the NHS assumed responsibility for clinicians’ 
negligence in the course of NHS work, so that patients now claim against the hospital 
in question, citing the clinician as the individual at fault if necessary. One rationale for 
this change (effectively a system of enterprise fault liability) was that hospitals are 
better placed than individual clinicians to institute risk management policies, 
although, for such policies to be successful, the hospital must resolve the principal-
agent problem that may arise between itself and its employees. NHS hospital Trusts 
now have a certain amount of financial autonomy, and can in principle pass on some 
of the risk from medical accidents to Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) who refer patients 
and commission much of the treatment that hospitals provide.  Moreover, since 1995, 
hospital trusts have been able to pool their clinical negligence risks through an 
arrangement known as the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST). This 
scheme meets claims arising from incidents since April 1995 in return for 
contributions to the risk pool, and is administered by the NHS Litigation Authority 
(NHSLA). 14  
 
Initially, as with other pooling arrangements, Trusts could influence their 
contributions by choosing an excess, below which they met all the costs of a claim,15 
and in 2001 45% of Trusts chose an excess of £10,000, 35% chose £25,000, 13% 
chose £50,000 and the remaining 7% chose an excess of £100,000. However, from 
April 2002 the NHSLA assumed financial responsibility for 100% of all claims 
against NHS hospitals (i.e. the excess level has been set at zero for all member trusts). 
This change was justified on the grounds that the decentralisation of accounting 
responsibilities for small value claims placed a burden on hospital management, and 
led to difficulties in producing consolidated estimates for the NHS accounts. It was 
also argued that, by assuming responsibility for all claims, the NHSLA would be in a 
better position to report on national trends in the frequency and cost of medical 
litigation, and to identify those activities and procedures most at risk of litigation.16  
 
                                                 
14 A further scheme, the Existing Liabilities Scheme (ELS), covers claim costs from incidents prior to April 
1995. In effect, this is a “run-off” scheme, under which the liabilities incurred by health authorities prior to 
the formation of trusts are settled.  
15 Trusts also paid 20% of the claim above the excess up to a pre-specified upper limit. 
16 In principle, data on claims could also be coordinated with data on reported adverse events, recording of 
which is now the responsibility of another agency, the National Patient Safety Agency. 
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Set against the potential benefits of transferring responsibility for claims from 
hospitals to the NHSLA are some potential costs. In particular, as discussed above, it 
is usually recognised that those who cause injuries should themselves face at least 
some of the injury costs, in order to provide potential injurers with an incentive to 
take care. In the health care sector, this issue is complicated by the fact that patients 
may be injured due to the interaction of multiple factors leading to organisational, 
rather than individual, failures. In those circumstances, it becomes important to 
provide hospital managers with incentives to take responsibility for identifying system 
failures and implementing risk management procedures. Arguably, the combined 
effect of switching financial responsibility for negligence from individual clinicians to 
hospitals, and imposing a minimum excess level as a condition of pooling risks 
through the CNST, represented a coherent policy in this respect in the UK during the 
1990s. However, the financial discipline and incentives this policy created have now 
been removed by reducing excess levels to zero.  
 
The one remaining financial incentive to pursue good risk management practices in 
the NHS’s current liability arrangements is through CNST subscription discounts, 
which are awarded to hospitals who achieve certain risk management standards as 
assessed by the NHSLA. In 2001, 29% of Trusts had no discount, 62% had a 10% 
discount, 8% had a 20% discount, and fewer than 1% had a 25% discount. While 
these discounts are related to risk management standards that are designed to include 
the presence of, inter alia, adequate incident reporting and complaints management 
systems, they are a reflection of processes, not outcomes. 17  
 
Prior to April 2001, hospitals with low excess levels faced a lower expected cost from 
increased litigation than those with high excess levels. Consequently it was possible 
for us to test whether any relationship could be detected between a hospital's litigation 
rate, measured by the observed claim frequency, and the hospital's previously chosen 
excess levels and assessed risk management discounts (Fenn et al, 2003). Our results 
(obtained using count data methods) indicate that high excess levels reduced the 
observed frequency of new claims and the observed stock of outstanding claims in 
2001. This evidence lends support to the view that hospitals with a higher share of 
                                                 
17 A second discount which does potentially give hospitals a financial stake in reducing the number and cost of 
claims is given by the NHSLA in relation to hospitals’ claims experience. However, it is unclear how claims 
experience is measured for this purpose. 
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liability are more likely to take action to reduce the frequency and stock of claims – a 
‘deterrence effect’. Consequently, the recent reduction of CNST excess levels to zero 
may have adverse consequences in terms of a higher number of claims. The evidence 
relating to risk management discounts is weaker, but there is a tentative suggestion 
that the stock of outstanding claims was lower for hospitals with high discounts for 
their risk management activities. 18
 
3.2. The financial cost to the NHS 
 
Over the last decade there have been well-documented difficulties in reliably 
estimating the full NHS cost of clinical negligence (Towse and Danzon, 1998; Fenn et 
al, 2000). First, there has been a lack of appreciation of the distinction between annual 
costs and outstanding clinical negligence liabilities – the latter being the provision in 
accounts for the stock of  claims against the NHS that have yet to be settled.  Second, 
there has been a progressive transfer of liabilities from the now disbanded Health 
Authorities to the NHS Trusts (each of which has separate accounting procedures), 
and in turn from Trusts to the NHSLA, as described above. Untangling the total cost 
to the NHS of clinical negligence has consequently been problematic.  The transfer of 
liabilities to the NHSLA is now complete, however, and it is possible to obtain data 
on overall cash paid out in damages and legal costs from the combined risk pools. 
From data provided to us by the NHSLA, we have estimated that the total in awards 
paid out to patients in 2000/01 was £249m, the total of legal costs incurred by 
claimants was £49m, and the total of legal costs incurred by defendants was £29m, 
making the overall financial cost of clinical negligence £327m for that year.19 This 
compares with a total cost to the NHS generally agreed to be in the region of £50m in 
1990 (Fenn et al, 1994).  
 
This increase in the cost of clinical negligence is partly the result of increased 
litigation, and partly the result of higher damage awards and legal costs. Fenn et al 
                                                 
18 While it might be argued that both excess levels and risk management activities are endogenous, the 
excess levels and discounts used in our analyses were set at the beginning of the year, and can therefore be 
assumed to be predetermined. 
19 Our own estimates for these costs in 2000/01, based partly on a survey of NHS Trusts, were slightly 
lower at £294m, due to a difference in the definition of claim closure. We project this cost rising to 
approximately £405m by 2005/6, reflecting increases in the litigation rate which have occurred over the 
last ten years or more, but assuming a steady state in terms of future claim frequency and severity 
(Fenn et al, 2002). 
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(2000) used the only comprehensive historic data source in England – from the 
Oxfordshire Health Authority – to estimate an average annual increase of 11% in the 
number of claims settled each year over the period 1990-1998, or 7% per annum after 
adjustment for the increase in hospital activity. During this period the rate of litigation 
increased from 0.46 to 0.81 settled claims per 1,000 finished consultant episodes, 
about 40% of which successfully obtained compensation. For England and Wales as a 
whole, using NHSLA data we estimate that there were approximately 3,500 claims 
settled with payment in 2000/01, at an average award of around £73,000. The median 
award is much lower, at £11,000, illustrating the skewness of the damage distribution 
with a small number of high cost settlements each year, particularly related to brain 
injuries at birth. A large number of claims are settled for relatively low damages, and 
yet the combined legal costs can still be substantial: for claims settled under £10,000 
(almost half of all claims settled), we estimate that the combined legal costs were 
approximately £7,000 on average. 
 
Finally, because both the rate of litigation and the mean award are increasing, the 
ultimate financial cost of claims against hospitals which are currently outstanding is 
difficult to estimate. As noted in the Introduction, in 2000/01 total NHS provisions for 
future settlements of negligence claims stood at £4.4bn. However, the mean duration 
of claim from initiation to closure is over five years, and some claims take decades to 
settle. The strength of evidence for these cases is not always clear, and rough 
estimates have to be made about the likelihood of payment on each claim, or the 
proportion of claims which will get paid in aggregate, in order to project forward the 
cost of future settlements. For both these reasons, the global figure of £4.4bn for NHS 
provisions is not particularly helpful as a guide for policy without further information 
about the process by which clinical negligence claims are settled and will be settled in 
future. 
 
4 INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE 
AND NO-FAULT SCHEMES 
 
Few international comparisons have been made of the characteristics or performance 
of different schemes for compensating clinical injuries, partly because of the 
difficulties of assembling reliable data. Yet such comparisons are instructive, 
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particularly when reforms are under consideration in England. Table 1 provides data 
to help illustrate several lessons from other jurisdictions, including no-fault clinical 
compensation schemes as well as two (relatively small) US jurisdictions for which 
comparable data are available: Utah and Colorado. The latter are of particular interest 
because in 1992 both states instituted programmes of research into their handling of 
clinical negligence claims, and piloted no-fault schemes from 1995.20  This was a 
response to concerns about the level of tort litigation and the associated premium 
levels charged to clinicians.  
 
4.1. Eligibility criteria 
 
It is clear from Table 1 that, consistent with their rejection of negligence criteria, the 
no-fault schemes compensate a larger number of claimants than does tort in England.  
(The Florida no-fault scheme is confined to birth injuries, which explains the 
relatively low claims rate and very high average payment).  Even so, an appreciable 
minority of claims is rejected under each scheme. To the extent that no-fault schemes 
permit the compensation of large numbers of claimants, they face a high potential 
cost.  For example, the New Zealand Accident Compensation Scheme’s nominal costs 
grew by 20% per annum between 1975 and 1989 (NZBR, 1998).21  Accordingly, 
designers of such schemes face a trade-off between cost and coverage.  Typically, this 
trade-off is dealt with in two ways. 
 
 
                                                 
20 Fuller institutional detail can be found in Fenn et al (2002). 
21 These costs relate to the whole range of accidents covered by the no-fault scheme in New Zealand 
(e.g. road and workplace); medical injuries were not separately accounted for.  However, the figures 
still make our point – that no-fault schemes can be open to substantial cost. 
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Table 1: Comparative data on no-fault compensation schemes in Sweden, New 
Zealand and the United States, and tort in England 
 
No-fault schemes Tort  
Sweden NZ Florida (birth 
injuries only) 
Utah  
[& Utah with 
severity 
threshold] 
Colorado 
[& Colorado 
with severity 
threshold] 
England 
Population (million) 8.910 3.737 0.256a 2.233 4.301 50.225 
Annual number of 
claims closed 
7,775 1,743 70 2,940b
[1,465b] 
5,919b
[973b] 
8,660 
Annual number of 
claims closed per 
100,000 popn. 
87 47 27 132 
[66] 
138 
[23] 
17 
Percent of closed claims 
involving payment to 
claimant 
47% 60% 47% n.a. n.a. 40% 
Annual number of paid 
claims per 100,000 
popn. 
41 28 13 n.a. n.a. 7 
Average payment 
(£2001) 
£7,078 £3,610 £404,588 £25,722 
[£29,836] 
£18,115 
[£44,616] 
£72,953 
Administration cost 
per case (£2001) 
n.a.c n.a.c £46,213 £7,717 
[£8,951] 
£5,435 
[£13,385] 
£18,744 
Sources: See Fenn et al (2002) 
Notes:  
a  The appropriate population for the Florida Neurological Injury Compensation Act scheme (NICA) is 
annual births, which we obtained from the US Census Bureau for 2000-2001. 
b  The recent nature of the Utah and Colorado pilot schemes mean that we report the estimated number 
of compensable events, based on analysis of records; actual claims will be a subset of compensable 
events (see Studdert et al (1997), p. 32). Lack of claims data also explains the empty paid claim cells 
for Utah and Colorado.      
c  We do not have comparable data on administrative costs for Sweden and New Zealand.  However, 
Danzon (2000b) notes that both are low.  Thus, in Sweden, the administration cost is "14-18% of total 
premiums [that fund the scheme], compared to roughly 60% in the US" (p. 1390), while the New 
Zealand no-fault accident scheme (that includes clinical injuries) has overhead costs "less than 10% of 
total expenditures" (p. 1393). 
 
4.1.1. Severity 
Costs can be controlled by tightly defining the severity of injury that qualifies for 
compensation.  All schemes do this, and Utah and Colorado provide interesting 
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illustrations.  In Table 1, we present the baseline figures for the performance of these 
schemes, but also a set of figures based on Studdert et al’s (1997) application of 
severity thresholds.  Thus, in Utah, application of a minimum 4-week-off-work injury 
threshold and a maximum damage level for pain and suffering reduces claims from 
132 per 100,000 population to 66.  Even larger reductions are achieved in Colorado 
by an 8-week threshold and the exclusion of compensation for foregone household 
production.  Thus, expenditure control is achieved at the expense of smaller value 
claims (which tend to form the bulk of claims, as the fall in claim rate in Table 1 
illustrates). 
 
4.1.2. Error-based injuries 
Both the Swedish and New Zealand schemes faced significant cost increases in the 
‘70s and ‘80s.  As a result, the definition of a compensable injury was altered to 
tighten eligibility.  Effectively, as Danzon (2000a, b) notes, in both cases an element 
of fault was re-introduced.  Taking Sweden as an example, a claim is compensable if 
(1) it occurred with “substantial probability” as a direct consequence of clinical error 
and (2) either the treatment was not clinically justified or the injury could have been 
avoided by treating it differently.  To the extent that Utah and Colorado have also 
invoked “Swedish schemes”, it appears hard to define a basis for compensation that 
does not recognise clinical error. 
 
4.2. Collateral offset 
 
Awards in England under tort are on average higher than awards under the no-fault 
schemes (apart from those restricted to birth-related injuries, such as Florida). An 
important reason for this is that most no-fault schemes take the role of second payers 
of compensation. The generous social security and public health care systems in 
Sweden are the primary sources of compensation in that country, while in the US the 
costs to the no-fault scheme of paid claims may be recovered or offset from collateral 
sources such as private health insurers. By comparison with no-fault benefits, tort 
awards are high as a consequence of the legal principle by which the injurer bears all 
of the costs incurred by his actions. Under an English no-fault scheme, collateral 
offset would presumably mean the NHS and social security system jointly taking 
responsibility for being first payers for health care costs and basic income 
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replacement respectively, with the patient compensation scheme meeting the cost of 
out-of-pocket expenses and non-recovered loss of earnings.22  
 
4.3. Parallel tort 
 
An important decision when designing a no-fault scheme (or a composite scheme) is 
the extent to which claimants also have recourse to the tort system.23  For example, in 
Florida ‘leakage rates’ of almost 20% into tort have been reported by Sloan et al 
(1997).  Interestingly, Swedish claimants also have recourse to tort but are far less 
frequent litigators. One important reason is that the generous social security provision 
mentioned above significantly reduces tort awards, making litigation ‘uncompetitive’.  
A further implication of both collateral offset and parallel tort is that the overall cost 
of patient compensation is unlikely to be isolated within the no-fault arrangements 
themselves. 
 
4.4. Administration costs 
 
One of the justifications for a no-fault scheme is the saving in administrative costs 
that follows from not having to prove liability in a complex legal case. The figures for 
Utah and Colorado in Table 1 tend to confirm this.  Studdert et al (1997) suggest 
administrative costs of 30% per claim dollar under no-fault (compared to 55% under 
tort in these States).  Estimates for Florida in Bovbjerg et al (1997) suggest that no-
fault administrative costs resemble fixed costs so that the cost/damages ratio falls as 
case value rises.  
 
4.5. Decoupling of compensation and deterrence 
 
We have noted that no-fault schemes may suffer from a diminution of deterrence 
incentives, unless the clinician continues to face the prospects of paying the no-fault 
award (which usually is not the case). Instead, such schemes have sought to 
                                                 
22 It is interesting to note that DoH (2003) appears to reflect this thinking by anticipating that the NHS 
will, where possible, provide packages of care under its small claims and birth-related neurological 
injury schemes. This will have the effect of reducing the financial sum required for full compensation 
under the schemes. 
23 To the extent that the European Convention on Human Rights requires citizens to have access to 
independent tribunals and appeals procedures, reform may be unable to foreclose this option. 
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“decouple” the compensation and deterrence objectives and to pursue deterrence by 
some form of monitoring and reporting system, the costs of which do not appear in 
Table 1.  For example, in Sweden a Medical Responsibility Board performs this role 
but tends not to be notified when a claim is brought against a clinician (Danzon, 
2000b).  Bovbjerg et al (1997) raise a similar concern about parallel arrangements in 
Florida.  In New Zealand, by contrast, it was intended to levy experience-rated 
premiums on clinicians, but according to Paterson (2001) this has never happened.24  
Studdert and Brennan (2001) are more sanguine about the prospects for experience-
rating and enterprise liability in Utah and Colorado. Thus, while the deterrence effects 
of any scheme (fault or no-fault) are hard to measure, there is some evidence that the 
costs of making alternative deterrence arrangements alongside no-fault schemes may 
be overlooked. 
 
4.6. Data requirements for modelling tort reform 
 
Apart from highlighting some key issues in clinical negligence reform, the discussion 
above also provides important information on the kinds of data necessary to model the 
effects of any proposed change.  In particular, we need to know the size of the likely 
pool of claimants, injury severity (for sensitivity analysis of alternative thresholds), 
leakage rates across the reformed scheme and tort, the administrative costs of tort and 
the proposed alternative and institutional details like the extent of any proposed 
collateral offset.  While our research has helped uncover reasonable data on the 
existing tort scheme in England, very few of these data are available for modelling an 
alternative scheme.  Accordingly, we begin the next section with a discussion of the 
data collection we have undertaken and the informed assumptions we have made to 
model reform proposals in England. 
 
5. COST ESTIMATES FOR ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES 
 
We now provide estimates for the impact of alternative patient compensation schemes 
if they were introduced in England.   Whilst such an exercise inevitably involves some 
degree of uncertainty, our estimates draw on a combination of information sources 
                                                 
24 Paterson laments a “medical profession that is shielded from damage claims for negligence.” (p. 14) 
and also suggests that no-fault has not increased the incidence of “whistle-blowing” in New Zealand.  
This experience contradicts the arguments made by Kennedy (2001): see the Introduction. 
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that has hitherto not been available. Despite the uncertainty surrounding our estimates, 
it is hard to imagine a rational debate on clinical negligence reform taking place 
without some explicit attempt at estimating the potential claims volumes and costs 
that a change of regime might generate. 
 
We choose to simulate two alternative reform proposals that have achieved some 
prominence in recent debate: 
 
i. A ‘Swedish-style’ scheme modelled on the no-fault arrangements available 
in that country.  This model underlies the no-fault experiments in Utah and 
Colorado and has been seen as a natural template for reform in England. 
ii. A ‘small claims’ scheme, as proposed in DoH (2003), whereby cases 
valued below a given threshold are offered speedy access to compensation 
based on the administrative assessment of fault, while larger ones pursue 
the traditional tort route.25 
 
To model these schemes, we draw partly on available data from the international 
experience described in the previous section, and partly on a population survey 
specially commissioned for our research and undertaken in 2001 by MORI. 
 
5.1. Population survey 
 
To the extent that alternative schemes remove the need to establish fault, or reduce the 
cost of claiming, it may be objected that they would increase the volume of claims, 
perhaps offsetting any administrative savings. We have seen above that this is the 
overseas experience.  In order to consider this for England, it is necessary to estimate 
the number of potential claimants for injuries caused as a result of medical care 
received, and also to estimate the proportion of these who might demand 
compensation if eligibility criteria or access costs were to change. We therefore 
designed a questionnaire to provide data on the incidence of adverse events in the 
English population and, when they occurred, to assess where they happened, their 
severity in terms of health and employment, the response considered most 
                                                 
25 The small number of (typically high cost) cases that would fall under the Department of Health’s 
proposed scheme for birth-related neurological injuries means that we do not assess the cost effects of 
this in detail. 
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appropriate, whether a legal claim was pursued, and the amount of compensation 
respondents considered acceptable. In addition, demographic information was 
obtained on respondents' age, sex, region, level of qualification/education, social 
class, and household income.  The questionnaire was administered in face-to-face 
interviews to a randomly selected sample of adults in four waves at weekly intervals 
during October/November, 2001.  Approximately 2,000 individuals were interviewed 
in each wave, giving a total sample size of 8,206.  
 
In response to an initial filter question, 4.8% of the sample believed that over the last 
three years they had suffered some illness, injury or impairment that in their opinion 
was caused by their medical treatment or care.  This annual rate of 1.6% is broadly 
consistent with Vincent et al’s (2001) estimate that 10% of hospital episodes involve 
some form of adverse event, and it provides an upper bound for the potential number 
of claims. Approximately 55% of those reporting some event claimed that it was 
insignificant, emotional only or minor and temporary, 15% reported a temporary 
major disability and almost 30% claimed that the event had had a permanent impact 
on their health.  A similar pattern of response was found with respect to impact on 
employment: of the 70% of respondents who were in work at the time of the event, 
approximately 48% stated that the impact was not relevant, non-existent or minor, 
16% reported having to take at least one month off work as a result of the event, and 
35% stated that they had had to take at least one year off work, retire, or move to a 
less demanding job. 
 
Respondents who considered that they had experienced an adverse event were then 
asked what remedy they considered to be most appropriate. The remedy most 
commonly considered appropriate was an apology or explanation (34%), followed by 
an inquiry into the causes (23%) or support in coping with the consequences (16%). 
11% of respondents indicated that financial compensation would have been the most 
appropriate response. In line with this finding, 11.4% of respondents stated that they 
had in fact pursued a legal claim for financial compensation. The main reasons given 
for not pursuing a claim were that the respondent did not want financial compensation 
(36.7%) or that it had not occurred to them (19.5%). Some 6.8% were worried about 
time-consuming complexity and 2.3% were worried about cost: we interpret this as 
suggesting that the proportion of potential claimants seeking financial compensation 
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could increase by 80% ((2.3+6.8)/11.4) if the costliness and complexity of the process 
was significantly reduced.  Those with more severe claims were more likely to have 
considered financial compensation. 
 
Finally, the survey provided some evidence on the relationship between pursuit of a 
financial claim and household income levels. As Figure 2 shows, the distribution of 
financial claims by income distribution was clearly bimodal, with higher proportions 
seeking financial compensation at lower and higher incomes.  This evidence is 
consistent with the interpretation that, whereas patients in lower income bands are 
able to pursue compensation through legal aid, and those in upper income bands have 
the means to access costly legal services, middle income households are less able to 
obtain access.  It also suggests a plausible limit to the propensity to make a legal claim 
in England: in the absence of significant cost pressures, some 18-20% of those with 
injuries are prepared to pursue financial compensation. 
 
Figure 2: Proportion of respondents pursuing a legal claim for financial  
 compensation 
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5.2. Assumptions 
 
Table 2 reports the assumptions made, baseline values and sources for the variables 
necessary to estimate the number and cost of claims likely to be made in England 
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against NHS hospitals under a Swedish style no-fault compensation scheme.  These 
are derived from the responses to questions contained in our population survey 
described above, and relate to the annual rates of perceived preventable adverse 
events, and the proportions of these that occur in NHS hospitals.  
 
As the claimants would no longer need to establish fault, the administrative cost of 
settling claims is based on Department of Health estimates for administering small 
claims through various ‘fast-track’ procedures, ranging from £300 to £4,100; a figure 
of £2,000 was suggested by the Department as a base case estimate, around which 
sensitivity analysis could be undertaken.  Concerning the mean award, the generosity 
of a Swedish style no-fault scheme in England would depend on whether various 
damage caps or limitations are adopted and on the interface with the social security 
system26; it is difficult to estimate the extent of the savings over tort damages, but a 
figure of 75% of the mean award under the current tort scheme was chosen as a 
starting value; again, sensitivity analysis was undertaken around this figure. 
 
Table 3 sets out our estimates concerning the number and cost of claims under an 
alternative ‘small claims’ scheme with various ceilings, and the sources of our 
information. The central threshold value we consider (a ceiling of £30,000) 
corresponds to the proposal put forward for discussion by the Department of Health 
(DoH, 2003). Such a scheme would retain the need to establish fault, but this would 
be undertaken by means of a streamlined ‘fast-track’ assessment procedure along 
similar lines to that assumed for a no-fault scheme and at a similar administrative cost. 
We estimate that a low cost, fast access to justice scheme could increase the number 
of patients who claim by 80% over the current system, a figure derived from 
responses to our population survey described above. The quid pro quo for this 
improvement in access is assumed to be a somewhat less generous award: the 
Department of Health has suggested27 a reduction of 15% compared with the 
compensation that would be obtained under tort. As a consequence of this, we assume 
that 20% of those eligible for the ‘fast-track’ scheme would opt instead for the 
traditional tort route, based on data on the leakage rate from the Florida no-fault 
                                                 
26 As pointed out in the previous section, one of the reasons for the affordability of no-fault in Sweden  
is its integration with a generous social security system on benefits. We are unable to assume this for 
England. 
27 Private correspondence. 
   22 
scheme into tort. This proportion is likely to vary depending on the injury severity and 
other features of the new scheme. Our estimate for the mean award under the scheme 
is therefore based on the mean tort award under each threshold value (obtained using 
NHSLA data), adjusted for the assumed savings and the proportion opting out. For 
those patients who are not eligible for the scheme because their claim is valued over 
the threshold, we assume that they continue to receive the mean tort award observed 
for claims over that value, and incur the mean legal costs observed for those claims. 
Finally, we also make assumptions about the likelihood and cost of legal advice and 
appeals by claimants under the scheme, provided to us by the Department of Health. 
 
Table 2: Assumptions determining number of claims made under Swedish-style 
no-fault compensation scheme 
Variable Baseline Source 
Population of England, 2001 50.225m ONS 
Annual rate of perceived preventable 
adverse events 
0.016 MORI survey 
Proportion of events occurring in NHS 
hospitals 
0.547 MORI survey 
Proportion of preventable adverse events 
giving rise to a claim 
0.19 MORI survey 
Swedish proportion of unpaid claims 0.58 Studdert et al (1997) 
Administrative cost of settling claims (£k) 2 Department of Health 
Mean award per case (£k) 54.71 75% of observed mean award for 
Existing Liabilities Scheme (ELS) 
and Clinical Negligence Scheme 
for Trusts (CNST) combined 
 
5.3. Simulations 
 
Using the assumptions in Table 2 above, Table 4 reports the estimated total annual 
cost of implementing a Swedish-style no-fault compensation scheme for hospital 
claims in England, with eligibility determined by demonstrating some form of 
preventability associated with the adverse event caused by medical care.  
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Table 3: Assumptions determining number and cost of claims made under ‘small 
claims’ scheme 
 Ceiling value of scheme  
 £10k £30k £50k Notes 
Mean award, Small Claims scheme (£k) 3.64 7.75 
 
10.69 CNST/ELS* paid claims distribution, 
adjusted for savings & opting out 
 
Mean award for those using tort (£k) 128.49 228.37 316.97 CNST/ELS paid claims distribution 
Proportion of paid claims under 
threshold 
 
0.447 0.71 0.801 CNST/ELS paid claims distribution 
Mean cost of Small Claims cases (£k) 2 2 2 Department of Health 
Mean combined cost for those using tort 
(over threshold) (£k) 
 
28.35 38.07 
 
45.67 CNST/ELS paid claims distribution 
Mean combined cost for those using tort 
(under threshold) (£k) 
 
7.19 10.89 12.18 CNST/ELS paid claims distribution 
Increase in Small Claims cases (%) 80 80 80 MORI survey: proportion currrently 
deterred by complexity and cost 
 
Percent of Small Claims cases who seek 
legal advice 
 
0.24 0.24 0.24 Assumption, equals 1.2 × number 
who appeal 
Cost of legal advice if sought (£k) 1.5 1.5 1.5 Department of Health, based on 10 
hour fixed fee contract with claimant 
solicitors firm 
 
Percent of Small Claims cases who 
appeal 
 
0.2 0.2 0.2 Department of Health 
Cost of administering an appeal (£k) 0.7 0.7 0.7 Department of Health, £700 from 
Criminal Injuries Compensation 
Appeals Panel 
*  Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts / Existing Liabilities Scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Simulated cost of Swedish style no-fault scheme in England   
Item Cost £’000s (2001) 
Annual total awards to claimants £1,919,263 
Annual total costs of administration  £167,036 
Annual total cost of scheme £2,086,300 
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The total cost is estimated to be approximately £2.1bn per annum. This is over six 
times the estimated current cost of fault-based compensation to the NHS in England, 
as set out in Section 3 above.28  This estimated total cost is likely to be sensitive to a 
number of parameters, in particular, the generosity of awards, the proportion of 
preventable adverse events for which a claim is made, and the mean cost of 
administering each claim. If the mean award is assumed to be £36,000 (i.e. 50% of the 
current mean tort award), the total annual cost of the scheme falls to £1.4bn, 
compared with £2.7bn when the mean award is £73,000 (i.e. unchanged from the 
current mean tort award).  When the proportion of preventable adverse events for 
which a claim is made falls to 10%, the total annual cost of the scheme falls to £1.1bn, 
compared with £3.8bn when 35% of adverse events result in a claim. Finally, when 
the mean cost of administering each claim is reduced to £300, the total annual cost of 
the scheme is estimated to be £1.9bn, compared with £2.3bn when the cost of 
administration rises to £4,100 per case.  
 
In light of the high cost of all variants of a Swedish-style no-fault compensation 
scheme, we next examine the estimated costs of a small claims scheme, as outlined 
above, at varying ceiling values defining eligibility.  
 
Table 5 shows that the total cost of the small claims scheme alone would vary 
between £48m and £158m per annum, depending on the threshold chosen for the 
scheme. The current suggestion in DoH (2003) consultation document is for a scheme 
with a ceiling of £30,000, which we estimate would cost in the region of £116m. Of 
course, some of this cost can be offset against reductions in the number of claims 
settled under tort. In the simulation the cost of cases going to tort falls from £450m to 
£374m as the ceiling increases from £10,000 to £50,000.29  The combined cost of 
compensating patients is therefore estimated to be between £498m and £533m, 
depending on the ceiling chosen. For a ceiling of £30,000, our estimate of the 
                                                 
28 This comparison is approximate in the sense that the current cash cost of clinical negligence is a 
reflection of past events, whereas the estimate we have made for a no-fault scheme assumes the 
immediate settlement of claims from current events.  
29 Note that the estimates for tort payments are based on assumptions about the current rate of new 
litigation, and assume all claims are settled immediately, for comparability with the small claim 
simulations. In the absence of any small claims scheme, these assumptions lead to 5,192 paid tort 
claims per year at a cost of £476m. Consequently these estimates are not directly comparable with the 
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combined annual cost is £518m compared with £476m for tort calculated on an 
equivalent basis (see footnote 30) – an additional annual cost of £42m.30
 
Table 5: Simulated annual throughput and costs of a’small claims’ scheme 
defined by different ceiling values 
 
 
 Ceiling values for small claims: 
 £10,000 £30,000 £50,000 
Claims paid (no.) 4,177 6,635 7,485 
Awards £’000 15,189 51,421 80,006 
Costs £’000 33,177 64,998 78,146 
Costs within small 
claims scheme 
 
Total £’000 48,366 116,419 158,151 
Claims paid (no.) 2,871 1,506 1,033 
Awards £’000 368,887 343,824 327,469 
Costs £’000 81,400 57,317 47,188 
Costs of cases 
using tort system 
Total £’000 450,287 401,141 374,657 
Combined cost of 
scheme 
Overall cost £’000 498,653 517,560 532,809 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The origins of the research reported in this paper lie in dissatisfaction expressed in 
many quarters about the performance of the current system in England by which 
patients are compensated for injuries related to their medical care. The system is said 
to be costly and time-consuming because of the need to prove fault, with the 
consequence that too few patients obtain compensation for their losses. In spite of this 
barrier to claiming, clinicians are accused of taking excessive care (‘defensive 
medicine’) and being unwilling to report mistakes for fear of being sued. 
Consequently, the Department of Health has proposed reforms that diminish (without 
removing) fault as the basis for compensation, and allow access to ‘fast-track’, low-
                                                                                                                                            
current cash cost of tort claims incurred by the NHS as presented in Section 3.2 above, derived from 
NHSLA payments. 
30 Once again, we would expect these estimates to vary depending on the precise values of 
administration costs, claims volumes in the presence of an ‘easier’ compensation scheme, reductions in 
award levels and tort leakage rates. 
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cost determination of eligibility and benefits for claims of relatively low value (DoH, 
2003). Our purpose here has been to summarise the key conceptual issues behind 
these policy choices, to review the evidence from both the UK and abroad, and to 
estimate the likely impact of a relevant range of policy options. 
 
We have argued that a system which holds clinicians legally responsible for patients’ 
injury costs makes very little sense as a pure compensation mechanism. The 
combination of legal process and liability insurance seems excessively cumbersome 
as a means of simply transferring funds between parties. Instead, the link between 
those responsible for an injury, and the amount of compensation paid, serves to place 
incentives appropriately, whether liability is based on fault or causation only. The key 
feature is the direct financial cost faced by the clinician or hospital from each mistake 
made, and this link can be a part of any well-designed compensation scheme, where 
the first payer is the agent best placed to take care. Any risk pooling the agent 
undertakes will also be incentive-compatible. We have referred to some evidence that 
the current English system of hospital-based liability has an impact on risk 
management behaviour by hospitals, but that this is in danger of being diluted through 
a recent reduction in cost-sharing measures. 
 
If a comprehensive no-fault scheme along Swedish lines were to be introduced in 
England, we have estimated that the cost to the NHS would be several times the cost 
of the current system, due to a much increased number of claimants. It therefore 
seems more likely that concern about the overall cost of reform will result in a limited 
adoption of no-fault compensation for birth-related injuries, in addition to the 
retention of fault within some streamlined administrative scheme for low value cases 
with a view to increasing access and improving administrative efficiency 
simultaneously – the preferred option in DoH (2003). We have presented a set of 
estimates for the cost of such a scheme depending on the threshold used to define a 
‘small value’ claim. These estimates suggest that such a scheme could potentially 
offer more rapid compensation to larger numbers of claimants than at present at an 
increase in annual total cost in the region of £42m (given the assumptions needed for 
comparability).  This relatively modest figure assumes the retention of fault and does 
not include the additional cost of a no-fault scheme for birth-related injuries. In both 
this and the small value scheme, the ultimate cost to the NHS will depend on the 
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administrative determination of liability; if the need to establish fault or causation is 
weakened, there is a large number of patients with potential claims under either 
scheme.  The social efficiency of these proposed reforms will of course depend on 
how they are implemented; increasing numbers of valid claims arising from clinical 
errors are potentially valuable signals, and providing they are used effectively as such, 
there could be benefits to patient safety alongside wider access to compensation. 
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